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Consolidation of the defense industrial base has led to concerns about 
whether enough competition exists between remaining firms to maintain 
needed cost reduction and innovation. We examine competition in the U.S. 
defense industrial base by performing an in-depth case study of Lockheed 
Martin and the F-22 program that considers multiple tiers of the industrial 
base. We find that defense firm specialization has led to outsourcing practices 
and arguably a more robust U.S. defense industrial base. Implications for 
government policy are identified. (JEL H57, O38, D43, L14) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the last decade, significant change has swept the defense 
industrial base. U.S. defense budgets related to the procurement of 
weapon systems fell by more than 65% in real terms following the end 
of the Cold War (Perry, 1993). Defense firms responded to decreased 
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defense spending by either exiting the industry or concentrating their 
operations within the defense industry (Augustine, 1997; Deutch, 
2001). The defense industry consolidation has resulted in primarily 
three firms, Boeing, Lockheed Martin (LM), and Northrop Grumman, 
serving as prime contractors to the U.S. government for major weapon 
systems. The move toward an oligopoly of defense firms has led to 
concerns about the level of competition (e.g., Birkler et al., 2003; 
Kovacic, 1999) and is recognized as an area requiring further research 
(Lorell, 2003). 
 
Government policy is an integral part of the structure of the 
defense industrial base as the government plays both the role of 
regulator and the only customer (Sapolsky and Gholz, 1999). A policy 
implication related to the consolidation of defense firms is that it has 
diminished the viability of some traditional methods of government 
oversight. Specifically, the impact of barring prime contractors from 
government work may be untenable. Quite simply, the impact of 
excluding prime contractors from defense contracts for misconduct, 
even temporarily, could be counterproductive when it eliminates the 
only available firm to meet a given requirement. For example, a 
suspension of Boeing’s space division for military contracts was waived 
multiple times, since it was the only firm that could provide space 
launch services in the required time frames (Merle, 2003). Still, as a 
result of identified transgressions, Boeing will lose approximately $1 
billion in business and gain a stronger competitor in the space business 
as LM rebuilds its space launch capabilities (Wong, 2003). 
 
An important policy question is whether defense industry 
consolidation has maintained levels of competition needed to 
encourage both cost reduction and innovation (Birkler et al., 2003; 
Cole and Squeo, 1999). Some research has questioned whether 
competition within the defense industry actually contributes to either 
innovation or cost reduction (Birkler et al., 2001; Kovacic and 
Smallwood, 1994). For example, innovation in combat aircraft 
historically occurs at times of increased demand, emergence of new 
component technologies (e.g., engines, guided weapons, radar, and 
stealth), and significant changes in government requirements (Lorell, 
2003). The goal of the current article is to examine competition in the 
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U.S. defense industrial base and make associated recommendations to 
address policy concerns. 
 
We define ‘‘defense firms’’ as companies that have established 
capabilities and competencies in dealing with the Department of 
Defense. The defense industry is a niche market in that it involves 
small numbers where both buyers and suppliers have significant 
bargaining power. Defense firms have developed a scarce competence 
in dealing with a monopsony customer with regulatory oversight 
(Driessnack and King, 2004). The scarcity of this competence can be 
readily observed as foreign firms and firms not accustomed to defense 
procurement teaming with defense firms when competing for a new 
U.S. Navy shipbuilding contract (Squeo, 2003). 
 
Although an important sector of a nation’s economy, it is 
difficult to perform empirical analysis of the defense industry (Anton 
and Yao, 1990). The difficulty in performing research on the defense 
industry has resulted in existing defense industry research exhibiting 
multiple shortcomings. One shortcoming of existing research is that 
studies often do not go beyond prime contractors, or the largest firms 
within the defense industry (e.g., Birkler et al., 2003), when the role 
of small firms in industries, in general, (King et al., 2003) and the 
defense industry, in particular (Squeo, 2002), has been recognized as 
important.1 To overcome the challenge of performing meaningful 
research in the defense industry, we perform a case study (e.g., 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). 
 
Applying a case study methodology provides an opportunity to 
explore competition in the defense industry in a way that adapts to the 
context of a small numbers market. Specifically, a case study allows 
examining the interaction among the defense prime contractors and 
their suppliers within the defense market. We use transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1975) as the foundation for our examination of 
the defense industry. By considering the exchanges within a firm and 
its external partners, we are able to consider conditions that fall 
outside the classic assumptions of a competitive market. In collecting 
information on the defense industry, we focus our attention on the 
fighter aircraft industry. 
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Fighter aircraft production requires capabilities above general 
aerospace manufacturing with increased technological demands for 
materials, avionics, engines, and systems integration that push the 
limits of design and engineering knowledge (King and Nowack, 2003). 
Additionally, aircraft programs involve technology development that is 
sensitive to both changes in technology and defense funding. 
Technological change has led to a periodic change in the number of 
firms competing for fighter aircraft development and to changes in the 
firm that has tended to win those contracts. For example, after 
emphasis shifted to avionics and guided missiles in the 1960s, 
McDonnell established leadership with its F-4 and F-15 aircrafts 
(Simonson, 1968). LM became the current industry leader, after 
it developed innovative stealth technology first used with the F-117 
stealth fighter (Lorell and Levaux, 1998) that has been subsequently 
applied to F-22 and F-35 aircraft. However, there have been no new 
entrants into manned U.S. aircraft production since World War II, and 
the award of the last two U.S. fighter programs (i.e., the F-22 and F-
35) to LM has heightened concerns about what can be expected from a 
dwindling number of potential aircraft suppliers. 
 
Whether surviving defense firms will sustain competition and 
innovation in fighter aircraft design and production remains an open 
question. Part of the U.S. Cold War military strategy was to use 
technology to counter the vast size of the Soviet military (Kitfield, 
1995). While only the United States currently operates stealth aircraft, 
Russia and Japan are reportedly working on developing stealth aircraft 
(Lambeth, 1996), so continued technological leadership by the United 
States in fighter aircraft technology requires continued innovation. 
Since the leadership of LM in fighter aircraft is representative of 
concerns about competition in the defense industry, we perform an in-
depth examination of LM’s F-22 program. Before performing that 
examination, we outline our application of transaction cost economics. 
 
II. Theoretical Foundation 
 
Transaction cost economics (North, 1990; Williamson, 1975) 
holds that managers choose the least costly method of organizing. 
Market exchange is generally considered more efficient than 
internalizing transactions, as it allows parties of a transaction to be 
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competitively selected and drives the most efficient pricing for buyers 
and suppliers. However, Williamson (1975) suggests that market 
failure precludes market exchange and drives internalization of 
exchanges within a firm. Williamson (1975, 39–40) originally outlined 
five situations that involve market failure: 
 
 Bounded rationality: human beings tend to search for adequate 
and not optimum solutions, 
 Uncertainty/complexity: conditions without readily discernable 
patterns or manageable number of interactions that would 
facilitate decision making, 
 Information impactedness: information asymmetry involving 
situations where one party is better informed than the other, 
making contractual arrangements difficult or expensive to 
verify, 
 Opportunism: power imbalances that allow one party of a 
contractual relationship to pursue self-interests, and/or 
 Small numbers: reduction in business choices resulting from 
limited quantities of either buyers or suppliers. 
 
Later, a sixth market failure involving ‘‘asset specificity,’’ or a 
condition created from recurring transactions that creates 
progressively stronger bilateral relationships, was identified 
(Williamson, 1979). 
 
The defense industry, with a limited number of suppliers and a 
single, government buyer, represents a small numbers market that 
would normally disband due to market pressures (i.e., new entrants). 
However, government procurement regulations, designed to minimize 
the potential for defense contractor opportunism, act as an entry 
barrier that results in newcomers and small firms teaming with 
defense firms that are familiar with defense procurement. Additional 
entry barriers relate to the level of technology capability required 
and the requirement for government security clearances to participate 
in the market. For example, building the necessary skills and 
supporting infrastructure to support entry into technological 
demanding markets such as fighter aircraft can take decades (King 
and Nowack, 2003). 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2007): pg. 57-66. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
6 
 
The role of defense prime contractors has evolved over time and 
increasingly involves providing ‘‘system integration,’’ or a coordinating 
role to ensure subsystems operate effectively together in an overall 
weapon system. Systems integration is crucial to fielding effective 
weapon systems within a reasonable time at an affordable price. In the 
past, the U.S. government provided selected subsystems as 
government finished equipment, and at times, the government acted 
as the final systems integrator. For example, the government played 
an active role in the integration of systems on the B-1B bomber. 
However, changing technology and increased reliance by the 
government on commercial practices has transferred the role of 
integrating subsystems to major defense firms (Lorell et al., 2000). At 
the same time, the increased emphasis on cost in a post–Cold War 
environment has contributed to major defense firms to allocate 
increased technical and financial responsibility to their suppliers. 
 
The combined impact of increased integration responsibilities 
and sharing of risk is a distribution of work within a technology market 
(i.e., Arora et al., 2001). This can be observed in an increased use of 
teaming by defense firms (Kovacic and Smallwood, 1994) (see Figure 
1). Additionally, the amount of work performed by defense prime 
contractors in-house has decreased over time. For example, in the 
early 1960s, aircraft firms performed approximately 45% of work in-
house (Hall and Johnson, 1968). Currently, LM with the F-22 contract 
performs 25% of the work in-house, or roughly half the work that was 
performed in-house on earlier programs.2 
 
The transaction costs associated with the difficulty of exchanges 
between prime contractors working to integrate subsystems into a 
working weapon system helps determine the governance structure the 
prime contractor uses to develop and produce a weapon system. The 
more problematic a transaction, the more likely it will be internalized 
(Williamson, 1975). Less problematic transactions, where technical 
and financial risk can be shared, will lead to closer supplier 
relationships, such as alliances or joint ventures. However, long-term 
relationships are expensive to maintain, so organizations tend to have 
no more partners than necessary (Humphries and Wilding, 2001). 
Meanwhile, market-driven exchanges allow greater competition for 
part and component suppliers, and a greater number of potential 
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suppliers will allow a prime contractor to either identify preferred 
suppliers or use full-and-open competition. The anticipated impact of 
transaction costs on a prime contractor’s governance structure of a 
weapon system is shown in Figure 2. 
 
III. LM F-22 Raptor 
 
A. Background 
 
The initial requirement for an Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) to 
replace the F-15 Eagle was identified by the Air Force in 1981, and, in 
1985, seven manufacturers were awarded initial concept definition 
contracts (Wall Street Journal, 1985). The field of seven was later 
narrowed to two contractor teams for building ATF prototypes with a 
partnership of Lockheed, General Dynamics (GD), and Boeing on one 
team and Northrop and McDonnell Douglas on the other (Charles, 
1987). A competitive fly-off of the competing designs with Lockheed’s 
YF-22, emphasizing maneuverability, and Northrop’s YF-23, 
emphasizing stealth and speed, was used to determine the winner of 
the ATF development contract (Wartzman, 1991). 
 
Formal teaming in the ATF competition allowed firms to share 
the risk of developing a prototype, and, in 1991, the Lockheed-led 
team won the ATF design competition (Schine, 1991). The F-22 design 
incorporated multiple technology advances, including super cruise (the 
ability to exceed the speed of sound without using afterburner) and 
vectored thrust engines, providing improved maneuverability.3 
Lockheed subsequently acquired GD’s aircraft division for $1.52 billion, 
in 1993, procuring its portion of the F-22 contract and F-16 production 
(Wall Street Journal, 1993). The GD acquisition increased Lockheed’s 
share of the F-22 program to 67.5%, while Boeing maintained a 
32.5% share. After winning the design competition, the F-22 program 
entered Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD) with a 
focus on establishing a stable, cost-effective design that further 
validates system capabilities through testing. 
 
During EMD, the F-22 program experienced several noteworthy 
events. Although delayed due to minor technology problems common 
to new aircraft development, the first flight of an F-22 took place on 
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September 7, 1997 from Lockheed’s Marietta, GA, facility (Kandebo, 
1997). The F-22 program experienced additional turbulence because of 
concerns over the cost of having three aircraft programs (i.e., F-22, F-
35, and F/A-18E/F) under development at the same time, leading to 
the F-22 program to experience political criticism. For example, in 
1999, the House of Representatives voted to eliminate funding for the 
F-22 program (Squeo, 2003).4 Most recently, the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review reviewed and reversed recent reductions to F-22 
procurement (King, 2006). Further, the F-22 program has recently met 
several milestones, including Full Rate Production (April 2005), Initial 
Operational Capability (December 2006), EMD completion (March 
2006). 
 
B. Governance Structure 
 
From the beginning of the F-22 program, LM took a 
collaborative approach to ensure that their ATF design was the most 
competitive, with Boeing having considerable experience with 
integrating avionics systems (Kovacic and Smallwood, 1994) and 
composite materials (Lorell, 2003) and GD having the most recent 
production experience with the literally thousands of F-16 aircraft 
produced.  
 
The distribution of work across Boeing and the divisions 
ofLMdoes not explain the extent of the industrial base supporting F-22 
development and production. Other firms in the defense market make 
significant contributions with over 1100 suppliers in more than 40 
states supporting the F-22 program.5 The result—less work is 
performed by LM and Boeing on the F-22 than would generally be 
assumed. This facilitates a division of innovative labor and allows firms 
to exploit industry-wide economies of scale in technology (e.g., Arora 
et al., 2001). 
 
LM’s formal corporate policy on ‘‘make or buy’’ decisions 
involves the application of competitive principles in order to make 
‘‘best-value’’ decisions and does not provide preferential treatment to 
LM business units. Development of major F-22 subsystems was 
competed by Lockheed during the ATF competition. Key ATF suppliers 
were carried over from the prototype phase to EMD based on a 
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competition sensitivity analysis performed by LM. Major subsystems 
were designated as sole source based on cost or the complexity of the 
work. These observations are consistent with our framework that 
exchanges on the F-22 program are driven by transaction costs. The 
actual distribution of work on the F-22 program is shown in Figure 3, 
and it shows that LM acts as the final systems integrator, performing a 
minority of work on billable materials. Billable materials represent the 
summation of all supplier costs (i.e., raw material, recurring labor, 
direct product engineering, factory support, overhead, general and 
administrative, and profit) to the prime contractor that performs final 
assembly. Using this measure allows examining relationships below 
the prime contractor level that have not been examined in extant 
research.  
 
Internalized Transactions. Fighter aircraft manufacture is 
demanding, and work retained by LM entails complex tasks. Only a 
quarter of work on the F-22 program has been kept internal to LM, 
with retained work primarily involving core competencies based on 
stealth technology and manufacture of major structural components 
(see Figure 4).6 Additionally, Lockheed7 acted to internalize key fighter 
production capability with its acquisition of GD’s aircraft division, in 
1993. 
 
Though initially criticized as a potential misstep (Cole, 1994), 
there is little doubt that the acquisition of GD’s aircraft division 
enhanced LM’s capabilities as a defense firm and had a positive impact 
on LM’s subsequent cash flow and earnings. Through the acquisition 
of GD’s aircraft division, Lockheed gained access to an additional 
32.5% of the F-22 contract and to F-16 aircraft contracts. Based on 
the dollar value of current and planned F-22 contract awards, it is 
estimated that LM will or has received an additional $10.5 billion in 
cash flows resulting from the acquisition of GD’s aircraft division. 
Additionally, since 1993, LM has been awarded $13 billion in F-16 
contracts by U.S. and foreign governments and is expected to gain up 
to $5 billion in cash flows related to sustaining F-16 U.S. military 
operations through 2018. For a $1.52 billion investment, LM gained 
access to cash flows valued at $1.6 billion.8 In addition to benefiting 
LM, it is also reasonable that the acquisition benefited the defense 
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industrial base by reducing surplus capacity and putting excess 
resources to more productive work (Duetch, 2001). 
 
Long-Term Relationships. Competition has forced prime 
contractors to specialize their technology portfolios and develop 
strategic alliances with other firms that can more efficiently provide 
needed products and expertise. LM continues to maintain a long-term 
teaming relationship with Boeing for F-22 aircraft, where Boeing is 
responsible for the F-22’s avionics and the manufacture of F-22 wings 
and rear fuselage (see Figure 4). The management of Boeing’s F-22 
work is similar to LM and is consistent with minimizing transaction 
costs. For example, the manufacturing of wings for the F-22 
represents a complex, labor-intensive process in that involves building 
a web of carbon fiber and titanium spars by hand (Gates, 2003); 
therefore, Boeing performs this work internally at its Seattle plant. 
However, Boeing also uses external suppliers to streamline production 
and ensure costs remain competitive. 
 
For its share of the F-22 contract, Boeing distributes work 
between itself and suppliers (see Figure 3). In comparison to total F-
22 billable materials, Boeing only performs 12% of F-22 work 
internally, and an additional 14.3% goes to Boeing’s strategic 
suppliers. Boeing’s largest subcontract representing 5.3% of F-22 
billable materials was awarded to a Northrop Grumman and Raytheon 
team to build the F-22 radar. Boeing also competitively awards 5.8% 
of F-22 billable materials to suppliers.  
 
Single-Source Suppliers. LM has developed relationships with 
key suppliers with eight out of the ‘‘top 10’’ F-22 subcontractors 
representing competitive selection of sole-source suppliers. For 
example, BAE supplies the electronic warfare system for the F-22 and 
Northrop Grumman supplies the F-22’s navigation system, which 
represent 5.7% and 5.0% of billable materials on the F-22, 
respectively. Together, the top 10 F-22 subcontractors perform 
roughly 18% of the billable materials on F-22 production. 
 
Both BAE and Northrop Grumman supply LM subsystems for the 
F-22 and the F-35. For example, Northrop Grumman performs around 
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10% of the work on the F-22 radar under Boeing and the F-22 
navigation system for LM, even though it lost the ATF competition 
and the company represents a competitor to both LM and Boeing. 
Additionally, Northrop Grumman has a 20% share of the work on the 
F-35 program led by LM (Lorell, 2003). An implication of LM selecting 
the most competitive suppliers on major subsystems for its aircraft 
programs is that it helps maintain the market for technology in the 
defense industry. 
 
Competition. Consistent with transaction cost theory,LMuses 
competition for general material (e.g., sheet metal, machined parts, 
and electromechanical hardware) that involve less 
uncertainty/complexity and where multiple suppliers exist. When only 
considering the F-22 prime defense contractors, close to 17% of 
billable materials for F-22 production is competed on an on-going basis 
(see Figure 3). Including work performed by additional tiers of the 
defense industrial base would only increase the amount of work on F-
22 production that is still exposed to market forces. 
 
LM has used innovative approaches to ensuring competition, 
where appropriate. For example, LM has embraced electronic 
commerce to ensure competed work is awarded at the lowest possible 
cost through improved information flow. Although skepticism about 
applying electronic commerce to the aerospace industry have been 
voiced (Mecham, 2001), LM in a single example of employing a 
reverse auction online saved over $2.2 million in material costs as 
their electronic marketplace led to reduced prices through competitive 
forces. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Even though the government awarded the F-22 contract to LM, 
winning the contract required that LM team with other defense 
contractors to offer the best performance at the lowest price. Further, 
the government’s continuous emphasis on cost has driven competition 
into the F-22 program. Figure 3 shows that LM and Boeing compete 
16.9% of F-22 work—a number that would be higher if additional 
competition held by subcontractors was included. 
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Simply assuming that a greater number of defense firms in the 
past resulted in greater competition may not be valid. First, the ability 
of defense firms to charge unreasonable prices is checked by the 
government’s role as both the sole customer and regulator. In fact, 
there is no reason to conclude that the level of competition in the 
defense industry has decreased or that costs charged to the 
government are not fair and reasonable, as analysis indicates that 
defense firms exhibit lower financial performance than commercial 
firms (Bowlin, 1999). Second, it could be argued that the level of 
competition in past fighter programs was actually lower. For example, 
only four defense firms competed for the F-15 contract that was 
awarded without a competitive fly-off (King and Massey, 1997), while 
seven firms competed for the F-22 contract that was awarded after a 
competitive fly-off. Third, advancing technology and specialization has 
required teaming between defense firms so they can offer the most 
competitive design solutions and share risk. This suggests that it may 
be more reasonable to say that the level of competition in the defense 
industry has increased because its market for technology is more 
developed. 
 
The end result of specialization by surviving defense firms and 
current teaming and outsourcing practices is arguably a more robust 
U.S. defense industrial base (Heinrich, 2002). A side effect of 
increased teaming is that a greater number of firms gain experience 
dealing with key technologies, such as stealth, increases competition 
for subsequent contracts (Kovacic and Smallwood, 1994). Therefore, 
even though the number of prime defense firms has decreased 
overtime, competition still exists as remaining firms compete for a 
larger share of procurement efforts at the second tier and below. 
 
A. Policy Implications 
 
Policy makers need to realize that applying the classic 
assumptions of a competitive marketplace with multiple buyers and 
sellers to the defense industry will result in suspect policy 
recommendations (Langlois and Robertson, 1995) and could have 
consequences other than those intended (King and Driessnack, 2003). 
For example, policy recommendations to shore up competition by 
maintaining two sources of supply may be misguided. For example, a 
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recent RAND study examining whether to maintain two suppliers for 
the F-35 program concluded that the cost associated with that option 
would outweigh any anticipated benefits (Birkler et al., 2001). Instead 
of a fixating on maintaining a second source of supply for weapons 
systems, policy makers may be better served by focusing on 
competition within the market for technology within the defense 
industry. 
 
Our findings indicate that policy makers in evaluating the 
efficiency of transactions (i.e., cost-effectiveness) should use a 
transaction cost perspective that considers the structure of the defense 
market and related transaction costs and then consider whether any 
feasible, superior alternatives exist (Williamson, 1985). Ensuring work 
is delegated to appropriate tiers of the defense industrial base will help 
maintain needed competition and innovation, while allowing prime 
contractors to leverage their core capabilities of systems integration 
and interfacing with a government customer at reduced overall cost. 
 
Additionally, history indicates that innovation is sustained as 
long as credible rival firms (Lorell, 2003) or technologies are present. 
The emergence of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) may represent a 
new innovation that may change the structure of the defense industry. 
For example, after the initial market entry by General Atomics 
Aeronautical Systems with Predator, in 1994, the market for 
unmanned aircraft is expected to reach $10 billion (Johnson, 2003). It 
is reasonable to expect that vigorous competition will transform the 
leadership of the aircraft industry with new entrants competing for 
future UAV development projects (Birkler et al., 2003). Policy makers 
need to encourage the development of rival technology to maintain 
competition and innovation. 
 
B. Summary 
 
Researchers (e.g., Quinn, 2000; Womack et al., 1990) have 
identified outsourcing as a means for firms to achieve faster and lower 
cost innovation, as long as managers focus on their firm’s core 
competencies and have established outsourcing management 
practices. Prime contractors in the defense industry and LM, in 
particular, appear to have taken this information and made it central 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2007): pg. 57-66. DOI. This article is © Wiley and permission has been 
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Wiley does not grant permission for this article to be 
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Wiley. 
14 
 
to their business strategy. We find that LM has focused on leveraging 
its core capabilities and experience of interfacing with its government 
customer in managing F-22 contracts. Specifically, LM focuses on 
manufacture, integration, and final assembly of aircraft, while 
outsourcing other systems through teaming (e.g., Boeing and F-22 
avionics), supplier relationships, or competition. The defense firms 
specializing in integration are decreasing costs by increasing the level 
of competition and innovation in the defense industry through 
increased outsourcing, and government policy should encourage its 
continued practice on the F-22 and other programs. 
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Notes 
1 In fiscal year 2003, LM exceeded government on small business mandates 
by awarding over 5% of the dollar value of F-22 work to small 
businesses on 500 procurement actions. 
2 The authors were provided in-depth access to information on LM’s 
subcontract management. 
3 The F-22’s F119 engine is provided by Pratt & Whitney as government 
finished equipment and is not included in our analysis. 
4 The threat of program cancellation has acted as an incentive to lower 
program costs. This is not an idle threat as major programs such as 
the Navy’s A-12 and the Army’s Crusader weapon systems have been 
cancelled due to cost overruns and changing requirements respectively 
(e.g., Jaffe et al., 2002; Pasztor, 1991). 
5 LM contracts with approximately 600 subcontractors while Boeing contracts 
with roughly 500 subcontractors. 
6 LM manufactures the mid- and forward fuselage and performs final assembly 
of the F-22 aircraft. 
7 At the time of the acquisition of GD’s aircraft division, Lockheed’s merger 
with Martin Marietta, which resulted in the current firm name of 
Lockheed Martin, was still to come. 
8 The value of anticipated cash flows was calculated with a discount rate of 
3.95% using the procedure described by Copeland (2000) with the 
exception that operating income is estimated to be 12% of cash flows, 
as the U.S. government limits the profit earned on defense contracts. 
 
Abbreviations 
ATF: Advanced Tactical Fighter 
EMD: Engineering Manufacturing and Development 
GD: General Dynamics 
LM: Lockheed Martin 
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
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Figure 1 
Teaming of Aircraft Prime Contractors by Program.  
Updated from Birkler et al., 2003 
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Figure 4 
Distribution of Work on F-22 Production 
 
 
Source: LM Corporation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
